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Reorganizing the Federal Environmental Effort
Michael McCloskey*
The rhetoric of recent years has driven home a new awareness: that
the earth's ecology cannot endure endless insult from man's technology
and industry. If heedless abuse continues, the habitability of the planet
may be jeopardized, and in any event, the quality of life will decline.
This realization raises an obvious question: what do we do to' forestall
these dangers, particularly in the United States?
The dawning of the environmental decade has come with few help-
ful suggestions being put forward about what can be done in the im-
mediate future, though many fundamental changes have been suggested,
ranging from changes in life style, to lowering the standard of living,
to abolishing capitalism, to overthrowing the industrial revolution.
Those who want to move now to try to cope pragmatically with the
problem are left wondering where their, energies can be most usefully
employed.
FEERA Focus FOR REORGANIZATION
Despite gjrowing Scepticism about the efficacy of federal action, I
would like to argue that the federal government should- be a prime
target in any program of environmental action, though not an exclu-
sive one. The federal government must be a focus for remedial action
because so many environmental problems are national in scope, reflec-
ting as they do the integrated nature of the nation's economy. Federal
pressure, for instance, on detergent formulas can produce quick re-
sults, whereas no state can have a comparable effect, and consumer boy-
cotts may take years to generate sufficient market pressure. Moreover,
often only the federal government has the power, as a huge institution,
to cope effectively with huge industries. In seeking remedies, it is vital
to employ institutions which have the inherent power to prevail. In
addition, many environmentally objectionable programs emanate from
the federal government, programs such as the SST. Remedial efforts
must be directed at the federal government to curb and redirect these
programs. Finally, while it is no easy task to move the federal govern-
* B.A., Harvard University; J.D., University of Oregon; Executive Director, Sierra
Club.
478
ReoIrganizing., Federal Environmental Effort :, :
ment, effort invested in this task may yield the greatest results in terms
of time and energy expended. It is often just as hard, if not harder, to
persuade state and local government and private industry to act as it
is the federal government. For the effort expended, a success at the
federal level can yield far greater results, inasmuch as national patterns,
rather than limited, local ones, are affected. Also, the obstacles in the
way of success at the federal level are usually fewer: the power of com-
mercial opponents is more diluted at the national level; a nationally
organized media tends to be sympathetic; and there are many forces at
the federal level that welcome additions to their power.
Complaints about the inefficiency and obstinacy of the federal
bureaucracy often overlook certain facts. The federal performance
often leaves something to be desired because contradictory instructions
are given the bureaucracy. For instance, Congress has asked the Corps
of Engineers to dredge wetlands, the Soil Conservation Service to fill
them, and the Bureau of Sport Fisheries to preserve them.1 It ,is no
wonder that progress seems slow. There is no agreement on the goal.
Moreover, the bureaucracy often fails to move forcefully because :dif-
ferent administrations keep shifting emphasis between moving cau-
tiously and quickly, and Congress often fails to provide the funding to
carry out instructions.2 In short, the public is often not clear in its
resolve and expectations when it establishes bureaucracies. Finally,
many problems which are given to agencies to solve are inherently
intractable. Quite often no consensus exists about what should be done,
and much of the knowledge and expertise that is needed simply does
not exist. Often an agency is simply directed to gather data, to make
grants to have the problem studied, and to develop demonstration
projects. This is particularly true in the environmental field, and is
also a characteristic pattern in dealing with social problems. On the
other hand, when clear goals are assigned, adequate funding is pro-
vided, and sufficient expertise is available, bureaucracies can be very
efficient. We become acutely aware of this when we oppose the program
of an agency, as with much of what the Corps of Engineers does. We
1. Cf. 16 U.S.C. §§ 590h, 715a to k-3 (1970); 33 U.S.C. §§ 540-41 (1970).
2. In fiscal year 1969, for instance, appropriations fell $974.2 million short of authorized
levels for solid waste disposal ($15.3 million), air pollution control ($96.3 million), for
land acquisition through the Land and Water Fund ($95.5 million), highway beautifica-
tion ($26.1 million), sewage treatment plants ($468 million), and water and sewage grants
($225 million). See Citizens Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality, Report to
the President and to the President's Council on Environmental Quality, Aug. 1969 (App.
B).
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tend then to complain about its excessive efficiency and call it "narrow
and mission-oriented." The problems, thus, with the federal govern-
ment often are not inherent, but reflect public confusion, indecision,
and at times, impossibly high hopes.
In continuing to look to the federal government for solutions many
environmentalists are fully aware of the pitfalls and the disappoint-
ments that are inevitable. They are not expecting miracles or instant
solutions. They are, however, determined to make progress. They
know some efforts will fail, while others will succeed in varying degrees.
Just as reformers working on previous problems have been pragmatic
in being willing to try various approaches, so also are many environ-
mentalists. They have promoted a multitude of programs and agencies,
which are as confusing in their own way as the alphabet of agencies
of the 1930's.
Some feel this confusion suggests that environmentalists should be
more concerned with questions of reorganization among agencies. The
question is often asked: How should the federal government best be
reorganized to meet the environmental crisis? What institutions are
needed to maintain a tolerable balance between nature and man's
works, and how should they be organized? To date, environmentalists
have shown little interest in these concerns. For the past decade they
have been more interested in developing basic programs and agencies
than they have been in ideal arrangements of agencies. In a pragmatic
manner, they have been trying to fashion effective new instruments
from the materials at hand, which often are older agencies being given
broader assignments, such as the Public Health Service, which initially
was given the task of abating both air and water pollution.
Until recently, environmentalists have been somewhat sceptical of
massive reorganization proposals for a number of reasons. For one
thing, these proposals often were suspected of being offered as a pana-
cea that they could not be. In promising to rearrange agencies, they
offered the illusion of forceful action but often the benefits were hard
to detect. Quite typically the problem has been more lack of authority
and funding than the departmental location of an agency. A reshuf-
fling of agencies might disrupt efficiency as much as it would improve it.
Moreover, some of the talk about reorganization seemed to come from
those who had a vested interest. One of the most outspoken advocates
of a Department of Natural Resources made it clear that his motive
was to get the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation to-
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gether so they could build bigger water projects. He wanted to engraft
the budget of the Corps onto that of the Bureau so that it could ac-
quire the financing needed to build the North American Water and
Power Alliance acqueduct from Canada.8 Clearly, too, the Secretary of
Interior has a vested interest in seeking to expand his department,
but such expansions do not necessarily work in the best interests of
the environment. Finally, environmentalists have not been too inter-
ested in the proposals of political scientists who have approached re-
organization on a mechanistic basis, devoid of commitments to policy
goals. Considerations of symmetry in structure and functionally related
grouping have not seemed compelling enough to be worth pursuing
for their own sake. In short, until recently there has been no real con-
stituency for reorganization.
A number of factors are now causing environmentalists to take a
closer look at questions of governmental organization. Foremost among
these factors is the heightened sense of urgency with which the en-
vironmental movement has been imbued by the basic questions of
survival that have surfaced in the last few years (this heightening is
evident in the progression of phrases that have been the watchwords
for the movement during the past decade: it began with emphasis on
outdoor recreation, shifted in the mid-sixties to natural beauty,
shifted again a few years later to environmental quality, and now
focuses on survival and ecology). Concern with survival demands that
all useful reforms should be pursued, including reorganization. More-
over, enough experience has been accumulated with various agencies
and programs to suggest that reorganization may be more helpful than
previously thought. First, more environmental agencies exist now
than before, and problems of interrelationships are becoming more
intricate. Second, as some agencies have grown, the problems of inap-
propriate departmental location have become more acute, as in the
case of the Federal Water Quality Administration, which has been
moved three times in five years, and is now in the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency. Third, as progress has been made in solving problems
of authority and funding, environmentalists are now better able to turn
their attention to questions of organization. Fourth, new agencies are
coming into existence that cannot find logical and hospitable housing
within any existing department. The Environmental Protection Agency
3. Senator Frank Moss of Utah has long been advocating reorganization for this pur-
pose. See S. 27, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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is an example; it was finally established as an independent agency. As
more new agencies come along, it will become increasingly critical that
problems of organizational structure be solved. The new agencies have
to be put somewhere where they can thrive.
RECOMMENDATIONS
While there has been a modicum of interest in environmental re-
structuring throughout the 1960's, interest began to quicken in 1969.
A number of major reorganizational bills were introduced in Congress
at that time, the principal ones by Senator Henry Jackson, Senator
Edmund Muskie, and Representative John Dingell. One close ob-
servor identified three main focal points of attention :at that time:
"(1) declaration of a national policy for the environment; (2) estab-
lishment of a high-level council for surveillance, review, and reporting
on the state of the environment; (3) reorganization of the executive
departments for more effective coordination and administration of
environmental policy." 4 These concerns were supplemented by interest
in improving the tools of Congressional action also, and in widening
the opportunities for action in the courts.
In just a few years considerable progress has been made on this
agenda. With the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969,5 a comprehensive statement of environmental policy has been
set forth for all federal activity. While this- policy is not self-executing,
it is important in setting a goal to which all other efforts can in theory
relate. The question of campatibility of goals, however, is ducked; it
remains to be seen, for instance, whether the Full Employment Act of
19466 can be compatible in practice with the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969. Under the National Environmental Policy Act, the
goal is stated to be establishing a state of productive harmony between
man and nature.7 Among other things, this state includes achieving a
balance between population numbers and resources, preserving diver-
sity in the environment and key elements in our national heritage, and
assuring that people's surroundings are safe, healthful, productive, and
pleasing." Moreover, the Act declares that it is the policy of the federal
4. L CALDWE.L, ENVIRONMENT: A CHALLENG FOR MODERN SocImr 217 (1970).
5. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (Supp. 1973).
6. 15 US.C. §§ 1021-25 (1970).
7. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4331(a) (Supp. 1973).
8. Id. § 4331(b).
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government to secure such an environment for our citizens, and that
they in turn have a responsibility to contribute to its, maintenance.9
Further national goals are defined as the wide sharing of amenities,
the avoidance of actions with undesirable and unintended conse-
quences, recycling of depletable resources, and acceptance of the obliga-
tions of trusteeship for future generations.10 While it is still too early to
ascertain ultimately how much effect this policy will have on federal
programs, agencies are having to take notice of it because of an action-
forcing mechanism jointed to it. This mechanism" consists of a require-
ment that all agencies proposing legislation, or contemplating major
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,
must file an advance statement furnishing information on environ-
mental impact. This statement is to include data on unavoidable ad-
verse effects, alternatives, comparison of local impact, short-term and
long-term effects, and irreversible or irretrievable commitments being
made. A flood of lawsuits has been brought by citizen groups to force
dilatory agencies to file these statements, 12 and many are now being
criticized for their self-serving and conclusionary character.13 Many
of these statements attempt to comply with the statute by merely as-
serting that the adverse effects are minimal, that no reasonable alter-
natives exist, that no long-term drawbacks will develop, and that simi-
larly no irreversible commitments are being made.
This action-forcing mechanism will fail to achieve its purpose unless
federal agencies are required to comply fully and thoughtfully. While
federal agencies are not required in their reports to show that ad-
verse impacts will be minimal, they are required to comply with the
general policy of the Act, to the extent permitted under their pres-
ent statutory authorities. To the extent they cannot, they were re-
quired to notify the President no later than July 1, 197 1.14
Oversight of this policy was vested by the National Environment
Quality Act in the Council on Environmental Quality, a three-man
Council housed in the Executive Office of the President.15 This Coun-
9. Id. § 4331(c).
10. Id. §§ 4331(a)-(b).
11. Id. § 4332(c).
12. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 45 F. Supp. 440 (WD. Wis. 1972).
13. See 1 ENVIRONMENTAL L. DIGm 52.0 (1970). A discussion of current problems in
securing full compliance with § 102(2)(c) of the Act can be found in chapter 1 of the Third
Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality, Aug. 1972.
14. 42 U.S.C.A. § 433 (Supp. 1973).
15. Id.. § 4342.
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cil was given the surveillance and review functions.16 It assesses the
state of the environment and the adequacy of federal programs. 17 It is
also to foster ecological research.' 8 Already it is evident that this Coun-
cil does not have the powers necessary to perform its work. When legis-
lation to establish this Council was being considered, environmentalists
proposed that the Council be given authority to veto federal actions
inconsistent with the policy of the Act. This was regarded as too large
a step to be taken at once. It was said that the Council would have to
prove itself first, and that in any event it would have the ear of the
President, who instead could be persuaded to veto the action. Never-
theless, the lack of any rejection authority is turning the requirement
of environmental impact reports into a hollow gesture. The Council
must be given clear authority, at the very least, to reject inadequately
prepared reports. It is now relying on persuasion alone to have poor
reports redone, and it is not even willing to let the public see many of
these.'9 The Council was given a clearer mandate to coordinate federal
environmental programs by the Environmental Quality Improvement
Act of 1970,20 but it still does not have authority to keep agencies from
violating the National Environmental Policy Act.21 These violations
are not an academic possibility. In the second session of the 91st Con-
gress, the Corps of Engineers forwarded requests for authorization of
45 projects for which no environmental reports were prepared.22 The
Council was not able to stop the Corps.
Not only does the Council lack sufficient authority, it also has been
denied the funding and staffing it is authorized. Ultimately, many en-
vironmentalists would like to see the Council become the traffic regu-
lator of federal environmental activity. In the environmental field, it
should perform functions analogous to those of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget. Moreover, some feel it should assume ombudsman
functions. It could have a division which hears public complaints and
tries to find the source of a problem and develop solutions through a
16. Id. § 4344.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. In mid-November 1970, the Council took the position that only "final" reports
were public documents and announced that it was reserving the right to keep reports
that were being revised from being released. Environmentalists protested this action on
the grounds that the Act makes no distinction between preliminary and final reports and
that the public ought to be able to participate in the process of critiquing reports when
they are first submitted.
20. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4371-74 (Supp. 1973).
21. Id. § 4372.
22. See, e.g., Tupling, Washington Report, SIERRA CLUB BULL. 31 (Oct. 1970).
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combination of persuasion and statutory power. In an Executive Order
implementing the Policy Act,23 the President gave the Council au-
thority to hold public hearings. This power might be used to begin
to develop functions of this sort.
In the summer of 1970, the President, following suggestions of his
Advisory Council on Executive Organization (the Ash Council), acted
under his reorganization powers to effect a massive reshuffling in the
Executive Branch of agencies with environmental responsibilities. Two
new super agencies were created: the Environmental Protection
Agency,24 which was made an independent agency, and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency,25 which was placed within the
Department of Commerce. While there was some Congressional oppo-
sition to placing the National Ocean and Atmospheric Agency in the
Commerce Department, no congressional veto was asserted, and both
reorganization plans went into effect.2 6
The National Environmental Protection Agency, a comprehensive
pollution control agency, is charged with identifying harmful pol-
lutants, setting allowable exposures and devising programs of preven-
tion and abatement .27 Thus, its activities include research, monitoring,
standard-setting, and enforcement. It drew together pollution control
activities from many departments: water pollution control from the
Department of the Interior, air pollution control from Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, and radiological control from the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Federal Radiation Council.
In contrast to the Council on Environmental Quality, which is an
oversight agency, the Environmental Protection Agency is an oper-
ating agency. It is to actually perform the work of combatting pollu-
tion.
While most environmentalists applauded the creation of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, it is too early to assess its success. Some of
the Environmental Protection Agency's arms have only recently re-
ceived the operating authority they need. It took action by the 91st
and 92d Congresses to complete action on a package of legislation to
overhaul basic water and air pollution statutes to give both its air and
water pollution control agencies authority to set federal standards on
23. 3 C.F.R. 903 (Comp. 1966-1970).
24. Id. at 1072.
25. Id. at 1076.
26. See Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality: The First Annual
Report of the Council on Environmental Quality, Aug. 1970 (App. H, I & J).
27. 3 C.F.R. 1072 (Comp. 1966-1970).
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intrastate as well as interstate activities, and to set emission and effluent
standards, with stricter enforcement.28 Also, basic legislation to control
noise pollution has just been enacted.29 Moreover, no real programs yet
exist to deal with pollution caused by heavy metals and other toxic
substances, though legislation in this subject will undoubtedly be
before the 93d Congress."° Finally, it remains to be seen whether the
Environmental Protection Agency will be successful in coordinating its
constituent agencies. For .instance, the Environmental Protection
Agency must assure that an industrial plant that is prevented from
passing its effluents into the air does not instead put them in nearby
waters.31 However, establishment of the Environmental Protection
Agency-does put the agencies with related purposes in closer proximity
to each other, and the top leadership of the agency will have only one
purpose-pollution control-and will not be diverted by other pro-
grams.
While establishment of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Agency was regarded as a logical step by environmentalists, many ob-
jected to it being placed in the Commerce Department. The ostensible
reason for housing it.there was that its largest component agency al-
ready was in Commerce, .the Environmental Services Administration,
which includes the Weather Bureau and the Coast and Geodetic Survey
among its better known bureaus, Other agencies which have gone into
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency include the Bureau of
Commercial Fisheries .from Interior, parts of Interior's Bureau of Sport
Fisheries (marine sport fish program), the marine minerals program
of the Bureau of Mines, and various research bodies in the Department
of the Navy and Army. For the most part, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Agency's functions are research and data collection. 2
Environmentalists believe the real purpose of this is to promote com-
merce, accelerate offshore mineral production, and exploitation of fish-
ery stocks. While the President has directed33 that the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Agency maintain close liaison with the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Council on Environmental Quality, environ-
mentalists fear that ecological constraints will be largely absent from
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58 (1970); 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421, 1430 (1970).
29. 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).
30. See S. 1487, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 5267, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R.
5390, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
31. 3 C.F.R. 1072 (Comp. 1966-1970).
32. Id. at 1076.
33. Address by Richard M. Nixon, Joint Session of Congress, Feb. 15, 1973.
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the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agehcy's outlook. They feel:
prime attention should be given to conserving -the ocean's productivity.
and quality, rather than to promoting its development. The present
placement of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, thus, can-
not be regarded as a final solution...
REMAINING AcrION
In light of the President's major re-organizational actions in 1970,
it is now logical to ask: what remains to be done? Actually, a great
deal still remains to be accomplished, though major steps have been
taken. In broad outline, the following probably constitutes an agenda
for further reform in the executive branch and related areas: (1)
environmentally irresponsible agencies need to be controlled; (2) regu-
latory commissions need to be reconstituted; (3) more new control
agencies need to be created; and (4) a new super-department probably;
should be established.
In bringing new agencies into existence, one does worry about a top-
heavy bureaucracy. Less new bureaucracy might be needed if some of
the older agencies were disbanded, or had their programs curtailed.
This is particularly true with respect to agencies such as the Corps of
Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Bureau of Public Roads,
the Federal Aviation Administration, and others whose programs
produce the most traumatic impacts on America's ecosystems. Some of
these agencies should just have their appropriations trimmed back,
while others should have major programs abolished, such as the chan-
nelization program of the Corps of Engineers and the Soil Conserva-
tion Service.84 Perhaps the Corps could be usefully redirected to build
sewage treatment plants, and the Bureau of Public Roads could be
assigned the task of constructing rapid transit systems. In any event,
care should be exercised in trying to reassign these agencies to other
departments. This should only be done in such a manner that a new
mission is given the agency. Otherwise, the reassignment may merely
create the illusion of reform without any real change in statutory direc-
tion.
One of the saddest results of reform efforts that began almost a cen-
tury ago is that regulatory commissions have failed largely to protect
34. See Report of the National Water Commission, Nov. 1972 (recommends curtail-
ments).
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the public interest. Whether by happenstance or design, these commis-
sions have tended, on the whole, to be lethargic at best, and at worst
to be instruments of those very interests the commissions are supposed
to regulate. The Federal Power Commission, the Federal Trade Com-
mission, and the Atomic Energy Commission all exhibit these symp-
toms, as Ralph Nader's investigations35 have revealed. Not only are the
commissions afflicted-with a fatal sympathy for promoting the business
of their charges, but the judicial stance they have adopted has caused
them to avoid taking affirmative and aggressive action to protect the
public interest. Rather than seeking to be the advocate of the public,
they wait for the public to show up to plead its case. If these commis-
sions are to be reformed, some way must be found to make it difficult
for commercial interests to capture control of them. One way may be
to expand the size of the commissions and to disperse the power to
appoint their members among so many elements in society that the
commercial interests involved cannot possibly capture all these elments.
One of the great innovations of the new approach to conservation
embodied in the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development
Commission was the dispersal of the appointing power: some of the
seats are appointed by federal agencies, some come from state agencies;
some are appointed by the Legislature; some by the Governor; and
some by the affected cities and counties. This approach might be tried
at the federal level.
The creation of the National Environmental Protection Agency has
raised a basic question about environmental responsibility in this
country. If we are to achieve the goals set forth in the Act, all elements
in society will have to conform to acceptable modes of conduct. Yet,
the Act only sets standards of conduct, and weak ones at that, for fed-
eral agencies. Why should these same standards not be applicable to the
states and to all private parties? The environment can be equally dam-
aged by a facility built by the federal government, state government, or
private industry. Ultimately, it will be necessary that all activity having
a significant impact on the environment be regulated. Legislation
should be enacted to make the National Environmental Policy Act
applicable to all industries that send products into interstate commerce
or pollutants across state lines. A new regulatory agency should be
35. See, e.g., R. FELLMETH, NADER REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1971);
J. TURNER, THE CHEMICAL FEAST: THE RALPH NADER STUDY GROUP REPORT ON FOOD PRO-
TECTION AND THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (1970).
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established to license plants, products, and advertising to assure that
they are environmentally safe. To get a license, a firm should have to
show that the place it wants to put its factory is suitable-that no rare
or indigenous species will be destroyed, for example; that its products
will not have side effects, nor release ubiquitous substances such as
polychlorinated biphenals into the atmosphere. Presently, utility plants
are licensed by many states. Why shouldn't chemical plants also be
licensed, to cite just one example? Presently, foodstuffs and drugs are
tested for safety. Why should other products not also have to pass
standards of environmental safety?
If such a new agency is brought into being to regulate industrial
operations, one immediately faces the question of where it should be
put. Certainly, it should not be put in the Commerce Department, as
its purposes are inimical to those of Commerce. Clearly, it is related in
general purpose to the Environmental Protection Agency, yet its func-
tions go beyond pollution prevention. It would be concerned with
questions of siting, land use, and consumer safety as well. In addition,
a number of proposals have been made to establish an agency to pre-
pare and coordinate energy planning in the United States. Inasmuch
as energy planning must be keyed to environmental constraints, such
as pollution controls, land planning, and conservation of scarce re-
sources, this agency would appear to be linked with the others.36 This
same problem will arise if other new environmental agencies, which
are under discussion, also are created. Senator Henry Jackson is advoca-
ting a bill to establish a national land use policy.37 It would set federal
standards in this field and require states to prepare statewide land use
plans. The plans would have to designate areas to be reserved as open
space and hopefully would identify areas of fragile ecology. A new
federal agency would be needed to oversee the adequacy of these plans.
Senator Jackson has proposed establishment of an office of Land Use
Policy Administration in the Department of the Interior as a new
agency that would take on this work. Similarly, Senator Philip Hart
is proposing legislation38 to provide greater federal control over the
generation of electrical power and the location of plants and trans-
mission lines. Under his bill, a new agency would be created to certify
that state plans for siting power plants are in conformance with federal
36. See S. 3802, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See also S. 70, 93d Cong., 1st Sess (1973).
37. See S. REP. No. 92-809, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See also S. 3600, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972).
38. S. 363, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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standards. It is not clear where this new..agency would be housed,
though the Nixon administration has proposed that it be in the Inter-
ior Department. A whole division for energy and mineral resources
has been proposed there under the Ash Commission's reorganization
scheme.39
The best answer to the question of where these new agencies should
be housed would appear to be establishment of a new Department of
Environmental Affairs. In the past, many proposals have been advanced
for a Department of Conservation, a Department of Natural -Resources;
a Department of Environment and Population, and the like.40 These
proposals have all met with an apathetic response because they did not
respond to any clear need. Most of these involved relabeling the Depart-
ment of the Interior and giving it additional agencies. Basically, the
Interior Department is designed to house agencies managing federal
lands and promoting development of natural resources. No important
function is served by changing its name, though some agencies might
be logically relocated there, such as the Forest Service and the Soil
Conservation Service from the Department of Agriculture, and the
Corps of Engineers.41 However, enough problems arise out of these
shifts to make it questionable as to whether there is any net environ-
mental gain. In any event, the Interior Department's scope and tradi-
tions are clearly too limited to make it a logical base for broader
environmental activity.
A Department of Environmental Affairs could be built around the
Environmental Protection Agency. In addition to the Environmental
Protection Agency, it could also include the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Agency, and the four new agencies I have just discussed:
those dealing with land planning, power plant siting, energy planning,
and environmental control of industrial operations. The latter agency
might also be put in charge of recycling programs. In addition to these,
some of the population control functions of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, which Congress extended in the 91st Congress,
might be better located in the new Department. 42 While research and
39. See Second Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality 7, Aug. 1971.
40. For a discussion of the case for such a department see Moss, Wilderness and the
Proposed Federal Department of Natural Resources, in WntanEaREss AND THE QUALITY OF
LIwx, 170 (M. McCloskey & J Gilligan, eds. 1969).
41. It now appears the President may try to establish such a department through
executive action under the Executive Reorganization Act. See Washington Star and Daily
News, Dec. 15, 1972 at A-14, col. 1.
42. Act of March 16, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-213, §§ 2-9, 84 Stat. 67.
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instruction on family planning might stay in the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, research on population levels and general
education on the relationship of population to environment might be
better housed with other environmental programs.
In addition to the agencies just mentioned, another new agency
might be established to aid all of those in the department. This would
be a branch of field legal services, similar to the Rural Legal Assistance
effort in the poverty program. This branch could provide lawyers at
public expense who would act as public defenders to make sure environ-
mental concerns -are not slighted by public and private interest alike.
Creation of a Department of Environmental Affairs would serve a
number of real needs. It would encourage the formation of needed
new agencies by offering a logical place to house them. It would
provide an impetus for moving the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Agency out of the Commerce Department, where it is likely to be given
undesirable direction. It would provide an improved mechanism for
coordinating environmental programs in an hospitable atmosphere.
And it would provide a strengthened and unified influence for sound
environmental policy in the federal government.
CONGRESSIONAL REORGANIZATION
If many environmental programs are unified in one department, this
would argue strongly for also restructuring the manner in which Con-
gress oversees these programs. Presently, environmental legislation is
handled by a plethora of committees: Interior, Commerce, Public
Works, Government Operations, and Labor and Welfare in the Senate;
Public Works, Interior, Merchant and Marine Fisheries, Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, Government Operations, and Science and
Astronautics in the House. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
is also involved, and of course the Appropriations Committees in both
houses fund all operating programs. The picture is further complicated
by a variety of subcommittees. 43 Legislation" has been passed twice
but never reported from conferences to establish a Joint Congressional
Committee on Environment and Technology to bring key members
43. See Muskie, Environmental Jurisdiction in the Congress and the Executive, 1
ENVIRONMENT L. REv. 141, 146 (1970). See also CONGRESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 229-33
(R. Cooley & G. Wandesforde-Smith, eds, 1970).
44. S.J. Res. 17, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); H.R.J. Res. 3, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
H.J.R. Res. 1117, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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of both houses together to oversee this burgeoning field of concern.
While this committee will afford a better look at the whole picture,
it cannot initiate legislation. This will remain the prerogative of the
standing subject committees. It seems increasingly doubtful that these
subject committees can continue to provide the kind of leadership and
support that strong environmental programs will need. In each instance,
the committee's main work is in other areas, with the possible excep-
tion of the Interior Committees. Environmental legislation should not
be the step-child of all of Congress's committees. As environmental pro-
grams in the executive branch become increasingly complex and inter-
related, Congress will find itself under growing pressure to establish
major standing committees on the environment. Such committees
would provide a parallel structure to the Department of Environmental
Affairs that I have suggested and could oversee all programs connected
with it.
IMPROVED REDRESS IN THE COURTS
Even if all the restructuring I have just described should take place,
environmental problems are not likely to be completely solved. Some
agencies will fail to perform as directed, and some polluters will escape
governmental detection. A strong role remains for private action, and
particularly private action in the courts. In the field of public law, the
standing of private groups to act as private attorneys general needs to
be clearly affirmed. While this novel doctrine-which permits private
citizens to seek judicial help in holding agencies to standards of lawful
conduct-has been growing in recent years, it is under a cloud of sorts
as a result of a recent holding of the Supreme Court in Sierra Club
v. Morton.45 While the Supreme Court did make it clear that non-
pecuniary interests provide a sufficient basis for standing in litigation,
it continued the requirement that litigants in fact suffer a direct
injury. Thus, it turned away from adopting a full doctrine of private
attorneys general that would have set forth a clear basis for citizen
access to the courts. 46 For only with such access can citizens hold
agencies to the intent of the statutes that they can persuade Congress
to pass. Legislation, moreover, is pending to give citizens a new cause
of action against polluters. The Hart-McGovern Bill47 would allow
45. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
46. Id.
47. S. 1032, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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citizens to file actions against polluters without having to show personal
injury, and they could obtain injunctive relief. Citizens' right to an
environment free of unreasonable impairment would be affirmed, and
they would have clear standing to sue in a representative capacity in a
new type of class action. Similar legislation has already been enacted in
the state of Michigan. 48
Finally, many believe the kinds of goals embodied in the National
Environmental Policy Agency and the Hart-McGovern Bill should be
clearly established as basic rights. They are calling for amendment of
the Constitution to provide a Bill of Environmental Rights that will
give birth to a new body of protective case law. Without such a new
Bill of Rights, they point to the following paradox:
Our old freedoms are being eroded without due process. With-
out any court order, any finding of fact, or any weighing of values,
our health, our security, our freedom, and our privacy are being
taken. These unauthorized takings of singleminded technologists
are unilateral, arbitrary, and private usurpations. If society should
in some instance decide that any taking is warranted, that decision
should be made by open, fair, and public processes.
And society should also draw lines around the nucleus of en-
vironmental rights. Certain rights should be invulnerable-inalien-
able. Just as nature's law of limits fixes the tolerances needed for
life, our laws also should set environmental limits beyond which
society cannot intrude, no matter what the excuse. While it may
take time for the courts to find and fix those limits, clearly there
must come a point where mass institutions are to be restrained
from poisoning people any further with effluents, additives, insecti-
cides, and smog.
We may be able to discover the seeds of the new rights we need
within the meaning of our old Bill of Rights. But the important
thing is that they be set forth and established now: the right to be
free from uninvited assault by noxious and annoying substances;
the right to be undisturbed by uninvited sounds; the right to be
unregimented and uncrowded; the right to have nature's presence
accessible and to have its most vivid and vital expressions unde-
filed; the right to have representative biological communities sur-
vive and to have the best soils conserved; the right to live as part
of a healthy ecosystem.
In short, we need a Bill of Environmental Rights that will make
continued life possible.49
48. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528 (202) (1971).
49. McCloskey, A Bill of Environmental Rights, in No DEPOSIT No RETURN 269 (H.
Johnson, ed. 1970).
493
Duquesne Law Review
Such a Bill of Rights could be an inspiration for all our environ-
mental institutions and would assure that the high purpose that
brought them into existence could not be neglected with impunity.
Our citizens would know their rights and would demand that they be
guaranteed.
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